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Simpson: Why Change Rule 11? Ramifications of the 1992 Amendment Proposal

WHY CHANGE RULE 11? RAMIFICATIONS OF THE

1992 AMENDMENT PROPOSAL

We are about to embark on yet another Rule 11 odyssey. From our past
journey we anticipate a rocky road. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

sanctions frivolous pleadings to deter baseless filings. Most attorneys have
had some experience with Rule 11 and there is evidence that the benefits
outweigh the harms. 1 However, a significant number of commentators disagree, and they have offered varying forms of change, ranging from outright
abandonment to minor adjustments in sanction determination.2 In reaction,
the Advisory Committee for Judicial Rules, in 1990, solicited comments
from interested lawyers, judges, and scholars regarding a possible amendment of Rule 11.1 The Advisory Committee's final recommendation
significantly changes Rule 11.

The proposal "broadens the scope of [the

attorney's duty to conduct reasonable inquiry], but places greater constraints
on the imposition of sanction. . . " What will be the impact of this new
Rule 11 on attorney conduct, and will it produce the results envisioned by the

Rules Committee?6

This Note examines the 1992 proposal to amend Rule 11.

Part I

explains the history of the 1983 amendment and discusses its operation and
intended goals. Part II discusses the perceived inadequacies of the 1983

1. Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the
Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147, 150 (1990); see also Claude Stem, Rule
11 in the Ninth Circuit, Report of the Ninth Circuit Rule 11 Study Committee (1992).
2. For proposals that recommend abandoning or substantially changing Rule 11, see George
Cochran, Rule 11: The Road To Amendment, 61 MISS. L.J. 5 (1991); John P. Frank, Bench-Bar
Amendment and Comment, 61 MiSS. L.J. 31 (1991); GREGORY J. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE
FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (Supp. 1992). For proposals that generally recommend
a less radical change, see Stem, supra note 1; STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION
THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
(1989). For a book that includes a complete list of law review articles on Rule 11, see
GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE II SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE
MEASURES (Supp. 1991). This Note primarily relies on the research of one course study
conducted by Jerold S. Solovy for its citation to case law as it is a unique list of all leading Rule
11 opinions. See JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., SANCTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1I, ALI-ABA, Course of study material (1992).
3. In July 1990, with approval of the Standing Committee, the Committee issued a call for
written comments on Rule 11. See 131 F.R.D. 344, 344.
4. Text of Proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 [hereinafter 1992
Proposal]. Refer to Appendix. (The 1992 Proposal and Advisory Committee notes are on file
at California Western School of Law, Law Review). This document was directly obtained from
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Supreme Court Building, Washington, DC 20544.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes (Proposed Amendment 1992) [hereinafter
1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes].
6. On September 22, 1992, the Judicial Conference, chaired by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, approved the proposed changes which now will be considered by the Supreme Court
and Congress. If approved, the proposal could become effective as early as Dec. 1, 1993. See
The Judicial Conference Would Alter Rule 11, THE NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 5.
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amendment which led to the recent proposal. Part III analyzes each
recommended change to the rule, its effect on attorney conduct, and potential
problems the proposal may present. Part IV considers an omission from
these changes.
I. HISTORY OF RULE 11
Prior to the 1983 amendment, -an attorney's signature on a pleading
represented a "good faith" belief it was well founded in fact and law.7 The
Rule gave the court the power to strike pleadings and discipline parties for
willful violation of the Rule such as submitting pleadings to harass or delay.'
Due to the difficulty in proving subjective bad faith, the rule was rarely
invoked during its first 45 years prior to the 1983 amendment."
In the early 1980s, concern arose in response to a perceived caseload
crisis." Debate as to the cause of this crisis resulted in the conclusion that
the federal courts were "an arena for abusive litigation tactics.", Dissatis'2
fied with the bar, the Chief Justice even alleged "lawyer incompetence.'
The pre-1983 form of the rule did not provide enough "teeth" to compel
attorney compliance.
In response, Congress amended Rule 11. t1 The 1983 Advisory Committee wanted to curb abusive litigation tactics and reduce costly, unnecessary
litigation.14 The new rule was "more stringent than the original good-faith
formula... [creating] a greater range of circumstances [that will] trigger its
violation." 5 The Advisory Committee thought this would streamline litigation by decreasing abusive tactics and frivolous claims.' 6
The 1983 Amendment's force lay in two major substantive changes. The
first change created an objective certification standard. The Committee

7. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315
(1986) (Attorney's signature represented that there was "'good ground to support [the
pleadings]' ..... ).
8. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 197
("For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action.").
9. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleasingand Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with FederalRule of Civil Procedure11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1976).
10. Cochran, supra note 2, at 6 n.4 (citing Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers & Professionalism:
A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission of Professionalism,
18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1149, 1159 (1987)).
11. Cochran, supra note 2, at 6.
12. Id. at n.5. (citing C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETIcS 185 n.2 (1986)).
13. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167-68 (1983); see Appendix.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes.
15. Id.
16. Id. ("Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the
imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help
to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses").
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changed the subjective good-faith requirement to an objective standard that
required a pleading to be filed only "after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law ..

"

17 The

Committee deleted the willful clause and inserted a higher standard to
prohibit filings for an "improper purpose.""
The second change made sanctions mandatory, arising either by a party's
motion or sua sponte. 19 Every violation, no matter how minor, had to be

sanctioned. This limitation on the court's discretionary power served three
purposes: to discourage inconsistent rulings; to avoid sympathetic determinations; and to reward a movant's efforts? Additionally, the rule dictated that
sanctions, if monetary, should
be based on reasonable expenses, including
"reasonable attorney's fees." 21 The judge should fashion any sanction, to
give effect to the rule's deterrent purpose 2 and to account for each party's

unique position and relative liability.'
The purpose of the 1983 amendment was to make an attorney "stop and
think" before filing a pleading.' The goal was to deter frivolous suits and
decrease costly, unnecessary litigation. The Rule gave powerful tools to the

bench and bar to achieve those goals. It is interesting to note that three
Supreme Court Justices dissented from the 1983 amendment, not because of

17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also ABA Standards and Guidelines, 121 F.D.R. 101, 121-22.
In determining whether a pleading, motion, or other paper is warranted by a good
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal or existing law, the court
considers all relevant circumstances, including:
a. whether the signer has offered arguments in support of the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law;
b. the legal sufficiency and plausibility of those arguments;
c. the creativity, novelty or innovativeness of those arguments;
d. any other objective indication that the signer sought the extension, modification or
reversal of existing law;
e. the candor and adequacy of the discussion of existing law, including adverse
precedent;
f. the clarity or ambiguity of existing law;
g. the nature of the case, including whether constitutional doctrines are implicated;
and
h. the danger of chilling either (i) the enthusiasm or creativity of counsel or (ii)
reasonable efforts to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
Id.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes.
19. Id.
20. Id. See also Nelken, supra note 7, at 1321-22.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
22. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989); Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communication Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes.
24. Id.
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its potential impact but because they believed the proposed rule fell short of
the changes needed to accomplish the reforms in civil litigation.'
The 1983 amendment has had an impact on attorney conduct, although
it is difficult to quantify that impact because there is little empirical data.'
However, some generalizations can be made. Rule 11 has forced lawyers to
"stop and think" before filing a pleadingY One study concluded that "the
rule has had a significant deterrent effect and ...

lawyers have changed the

way they practice as a result of the amendment[] to Rule 1."28 It has
changed attorney behavior in their pre-filing factual and legal inquiries, their
review of papers prepared by other attorneys and their pre-filing documentation activity.' While this outcome is significant, many judges still view
Rule 11 as only the fifth most effective method to manage frivolous suits .
Additionally, many attorneys approach the Rule pragmatically, only
increasing their pre-filing inquiry when practicing before a judge with a
Thus, the Rule has achieved
reputation for strict Rule 11 enforcement.
some progress, but it is not an overwhelming success.
The Rule's modest success has not come without detrimental side-effects.
Its use has arguably produced a chilling effect on creative arguments, created
destructive satellite litigation, increased incivility among members of the bar,
and has interfered with the attorney-client relationship.
A. The Chilling Effect
Some commentators believe that a chilling effect is produced by judicial
intolerance for novel theories,32 and inconsistent application of the Rule. 3

25. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 998 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist).
26. There have been three recent studies. The American Judicature Society study focused
on attorney experience in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits; the Federal Judicial Center
study focused on federal district court judges' experience around the country, see FJC Directions
#2, Special Issue on Rule 11, Nov. 1991; and Nelkin, supra note 1; additionally, the Ninth
Circuit published a report that combines all three prior studies, see Stern, supra note 1.
27. H. Kritzer, et al., Rule 11: Moving Beyond The Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269,
269 (1992). "The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules notes that the goal of the 1983 version
of Rule 11 is to get litigants to 'stop and think' . . . The data confirms that Rule 11 has had
some effect in this regard." Id.
28. Nelken, supra note 1, at 151.
29. Stem, supra note 1, at 25-26.
30. Id. at 27. "The judges ranked Rule I l's effectiveness behind prompt rulings on 12(b)
motions; prompt rulings on summary judgment motions; Rule 16 conferences; and informal
admonitions." Id.
31. Nelken, supra note 1, at 149.
32. BURBANK, supra note 2. ("In even a close case, we think it extremely unlikely that a
judge, who has already decided that the law is not as a lawyer argued it, will also decide that
the loser's position was warranted by existing law." (citing Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v.
Borroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986)).).
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The Advisory Committee addressed judicial intolerance in the 1983 Rule.
They attempted to dispel concern that the new rule would chill creative
advocacy declaring that "[this] rule is not intended to chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories, [and courts are
to refrain] from using the wisdom of hindsight."3 Consistent with this
recommendation, a Judge of the Fifth Circuit, recently advised Judges "[t]o
"3
put up with a certain amount of borderline, or even bad, lawyering. 1
While the Rule is intended to discourage frivolous pleadings, it becomes
destructive when it deters meritorious claims. The problem of course, is in
consistently distinguishing between the two.
6
Inconsistent application of the Rule also chills creative arguments.
Inconsistent application has been the hallmark of Rule 11 activity. 37 While
the Rule applies an objective standard to judge the reasonableness of a
pleading, reasonableness is determined through a judge's subjective
beliefs .3 A study that presented 292 judges with ten hypothetical Rule 11
situations found that almost half of the judges would have awarded sanctions
while the other half would have found merit.3 9 Such a remarkable conflict
in application obviously causes attorneys to file only safe claims to avoid the
chance of sanctions. Additionally, attorneys may use Rule l I's inconsistent
application as another tool to prevail on the merits. An attorney may threaten opposing counsel with sanctions to induce the latter to dismiss meritorious
claims.' Due to judicial inconsistency, the opposing counsel may yield to
this threat out of fear of sanctions.41
The empirical data neither confirms nor refutes the chilling effect
phenomena. Twenty-seven percent of the attorneys in the Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have altered their pre-filing inquiry due to possible sanc-

33. See, e.g., Mark S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation
Defeat the Purpose of Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal
Arguments, 132 F.R.D. 309, 316 (1990); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican
Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1941 (1989); William W.
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (1988).
34. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 11, Advisory Committee notes.

35. Sam D. Johnson et al., The Least Severe Sanction Adequate: Reversing the Trend in Rule
11 Sanctions, 61 MISS. L.J. 39, 54 (1991).
36. See supra note 33.
37. "The study within the Ninth Circuit found 21.4% of judges had not imposed sanction
at all in the past year; 25% imposed sanctions once or twice during this time period, but
approximately 26% imposed sanctions five or more times." Stem, supra note 1, at 10; "Our
census results indicate that Rule 11 is being applied unevenly." CARL B. HILUARD & MICHAEL
E. CHISHOLM, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION RULE 11 SURVEY 12 (1992).

38. See e.g., William G. Swindal, Frivolity in Court: New Rule 11, 13 LITG. 3, 4 (1987).
39. Vairo, supra note 1, at 1-22. (citing S. Kasin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions
38 (Fed. Judicial Center 1985)). A recent survey found that judges were divided within the
margins of 40% to 60% over four hypothetical questions. Hilliard & Chisholm, supra note 37,
at 12.
40. Stein, supra note 33, at 312.

41. Id.
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tions.42 Of this group, twenty-seven percent of the Ninth Circuit did not
raise a particular claim or defense." The study does not delineate whether
this result represents the exclusion of frivolous papers or the chilling of
creative argumentation.
B. Satellite Litigation
Rule 11 has created substantial satellite litigation that is dedicated to the
resolution of conflicts that are ancillary to the legal disputes. Its activity has
"spawned a body of substantive law."I Over 3,000 Rule 11 cases current-

ly appear on Lexis, and this figure underestimates the actual activity.45 In
response to this activity, a Shepard's Rule 11 service has emerged. The
reported opinions typically describe a costly, time-consuming appellate battle
that lends credence to the theory that Rule 11 has created unjustifiably
destructive satellite litigation.' This increased satellite litigation frustrates
a key objective of the Rule, to reduce "cost and delay in the Courts." 47
Some commentators, however, claim these cases are necessary for
circuit development of precedent dealing with a new rule. 4 This "shakeout" period was expected to last five years, ending in 1988. 49 Even
accepting these predictions, given the potential for high awards' in addition

42. Stem, supra note 1,at 25.
43. Id.
44. Jeffery Neal Cole, Rule 11 Now, LITIG., Spring 1991, at 10, 10.
45. See FJC Directions #2, Special Issue on Rule 11, Nov. 1991, at 7 (showing that over
1,000 cases involved Rule 11 in five districts over a three year period, while only 66 opinions
were published during a six year period including the studied period).
46. Prime examples of this type of satellite activity are the Eastway I and Eastway 1I
decisions. This single Rule 11 dispute involved two trips to the Second Circuit where there was
considerable judicial disagreement, finally resolving the issue with a $10,000 award. Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway 1); and Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987) (Eastway II).
47. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986).
48. T.E. WILLGING, THE RULE II SANCTIONING PROCESS 108 (1988).
49. Id.
50. GREGORY J. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 387 (1990)
(citing Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., 869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 935 ($84,113.01 sanction award vacated and remanded; Rule 11 violation affirmed), affld
in part, vacated in part, 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 844 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1988) ($230,000 sanction award and remanded for reconsideration); Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1988) ($79,870
sanction award affirmed in part, reversed in part), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Unioil,
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986) ($294,141.10 sanction award
affirmed), cert. denied sub nom. Barton v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 484 U.S. 822 (1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Alioto & Alioto v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 484 U.S. 823 (1987); In re Yagnan,
796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986) ($250,000 sanction award reversed), cert. denied sub nom. Real
v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987)).
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to the inconsistent application of the Rule,51 a significant decrease in
satellite litigation is unlikely.52
The 1983 Committee recognized the potential cost, in terms of extra
pleadings and hearings, associated with Rule 11 litigation. To mitigate the
cost, they recommended sanction proceedings be limited to the record already
established in the case.53 This would reduce the time required for both the
court and the attorneys to resolve a Rule 11 dispute. However, in practice,
due to the impact sanctions have on the violator, judges may feel compelled
to use more reliable means of determining a violation of Rule 11 than
examining the record.
There is little empirical evidence about the extent of satellite litigation.' However, that Rule 11 has assumed a litigation life of its own leads
to the conclusion that satellite litigation is a significant problem.
C. Incivility Problem Among the Bar
Rule 11 has contributed to an increasing problem of incivility within the
bar. Incivility is defined as "irregular; improper; out of the due course of
law." 55 One study concluded that "lack of civility can escalate

. . .

litiga-

tion cost."56 A senior associate attorney stated, "When you seek Rule 11
sanctions against another lawyer, it's sort of a declaration of war." 57 Each
motion for sanctions reflects on the professionalism of the opposing attorney.
Rule 11 provides a valuable tool to every attorney who vigorously represents
his client. A threat of sanctions can persuade an opposing attorney to
dismiss a complaint which is based on a novel but meritorious position.5"
The threatening attorney must not only consider the costs of threatening the
opposing attorney. The primary risk in threatening sanctions is it tends to
poison the relationship with opposing counsel and be viewed as cutthroat.5 9

This factor exacerbates the growing incivility problem of the bar. A recent

51. See supra note 37.
52. Cf. Stein, supra note 40. (Author argues that a lawyer's decision whether to seek
sanctions is determined by "the likelihood of success, the value of success and the costs and

risks of invoking Rule I1"). Id. at 312.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes.

54. Stem, supra note 1, at 5 ("more work needs to be done in assessing the extent of
satellite litigation.").
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of incivility as it relates to its

Latin root incivile).
56. MARVIN E. ASPEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 6 (1992).

57. Paul D. Freeman, The Rule 11 Ruckus: Sanctions Have ChangedFederal Practice-and
Bitterly Divided the Bar, 11 MAY CAL. LAW. 17, 20 (1991).
58. Stein, supra note 33 at 312. "In his effort to prevail on the merits, the responding
lawyer will be led to make different use of Rule 11 than he would were he motivated by the
purposes that motivated the drafter[s] of the Rule. The responding lawyer will use Rule 11 to
deter what he most needs to deter: not frivolous arguments, but dangerous arguments." Id.
59. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

7

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 2, Art. 7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

survey found that seventy nine percent of the attorneys in the Seventh Circuit
feel an incivility problem exists." "[I]ncreased tensions among the parties... mak[es] it more difficult to conduct the litigation in a rational
manner and reach accommodation." 6' As long as the Rule provides a
means to victory, the detrimental side effect of increased incivility may not
deter many attorneys from such cutthroat activity, and civility among the bar
will continue to deteriorate.
D. The Attorney-Client Relationship
The Rule is structured in a way that inherently intrudes on the attorneyclient relationship. Rule 11 requires a reasonable pre-filing inquiry into the
facts and law and mandates sanctioning of "the person who signed it, a
represented party [if they signed], or both." 2 To analyze the reasonableness of the attorney's pre-filing activity, the court must pry into the
counsel's conduct while preparing the paper. This conduct includes client
communications and other involvement which falls under the attorney-client
privilege. Also, the threat of sanctions on both the represented party and the
attorney may place their interests at odds. This is especially true in sanction
proceedings based on inadequate factual inquiry. "Because a lawyer may
reveal client confidences to defend against charges of wrongdoing, the
privilege will often cease to exist."' Indeed, some courts have required
separate representation for the party and counsel.'
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE 1992 PROPOSAL
As discussed above, the 1983 amendment had positive and negative
impacts. While some commentators would like the Rule to be severely
limited, the general consensus is the benefits have outweighed the costs.6A
The 1992 proposal is intended to maintain the positive effect of increased
pre-filing investigation while limiting the Rule's negative effects.
Two characteristics of the current formulation, inconsistent application
of the Rule and large monetary awards, seem to intensify and encourage each
of the negative side-effects. Consequently, any attempt to reform Rule 11
must focus on reforming these characteristics. For example, inconsistent
application of the Rule causes attorneys to shy away from taking creative
positions for fear of sanctions. Large monetary awards lure opposing
60. Mark Hansen, Incivility a Problem, Survey Says, A.B.A. J., July 1991, at 22.

61. William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1018 (1988).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes; see also White v. American Airlines,
915 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir. 1990).
63. Cole, supra note 44, at 5 1.
64. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part

on other grounds, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
65. See supra note 1.
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attorneys into filing a Rule 11 action as a cost shifting possibility. And both
characteristics have contributed to the recent decrease in civility in the bar
and increased the potential for intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.
In the end, these negative characteristics may not be controllable, never-

theless any far-reaching reform of Rule 11 must attempt to contain both of
these unfortunate effects.
The drafters of the 1992 proposal learned from the last decade and have
provided a version that attempts to reduce inconsistent application and large
monetary sanctions. This "should reduce the number of motions for
sanctions presented to the court."' "The revision, in part, expands the
responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater constraint
and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule."6'
III. 1992 PROPOSAL

A. ProceduralRequirements
Obviously, proceedings under the current Rule must satisfy due process
requirements.' Without notice and an opportunity to be heard, sanctions are

not sustained.'
Current debate centers on what constitutes minimal
standards for notice and an opportunity to be heard. The standard necessary
to satisfy notice differs depending on the conduct to be sanctioned. Many
courts treat proceedings involving factually frivolous papers differently from
those involving legally frivolous or dilatory papers.7' Regarding the
standards necessary for an opportunity to be heard, the majority of courts
agree that this right does not include oral hearings. 7 The Advisory
Committee recommends "the court must to the extent possible limit the scope

of sanction proceedings to the record. "I
The proposal explicitly adopts due process standards.

The proposal

incorporates two changes that provide notice: a safe harbor period which

66. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
67. Id.
68. FED.R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes. "The procedure must... comport with
due process requirements ... [and] the format to be followed should depend on the
circumstances of the situation and the severity of the sanction under consideration." Id.; see also
Henderson v. Department of Public Safety, 901 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1990); G.J.B. & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F. 2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1990).
69. Securities Industry Assn. v. Clarke, 898 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1990).
70. Many courts held that Rule I I itself provided notice of proceedings involving factually
frivolous pleadings. Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533 (11th Cir. 1990). Contra Tom Growney
Equipment Co. v. Shelley Development, Inc., 834 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987) & Media
Duplication Servs. v. HDG Software, 928 F.2d 1228, 1238 (Ist Cir. 1991). However, courts
revuire specifie notice, including reasons, when dealing with potential dilatory or legally
volous paper. Spiller v. Ella Smithers Geriatric Center, 919 F.2d 339, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1990);
McGregor v. Board of Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 956 F.2d 1017(11th Cir. 1992).
71. E.g., Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 898 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. FED. R. CIv. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes.
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grants a potential violator time to change or withdraw from a frivolous
position without fear of sanctions,' and a requirement that a show cause
order be issued to a potential violator prior to a sua sponte imposition of
sanctions.74 Also, the proposal maintains the current minimum standard of
an opportunity to be heard, either by written submission or oral argument at
the court's discretion.'5 The Rule further mandates that a party seeking
sanctions make a request for sanctions in a separate motion and not by
simply including it as an addendum to other motions.76
The safe harbor provision prevents a movant from filing a motion for
sanctions with the court until 21 days after the motion has been served on the
opposing party. 7 During this period, if the opposing party corrects his
position the motion should not be filed.78 When appropriate, an attorney
should encourage, in writing, opposing counsel to investigate possible
79
factually or legally infirm positions using the threat of Rule 11 sanctions.
The use of threats, as envisioned by the safe harbor provision, codifies
common and recommended practice.' The potential violator can dispense
with the threat "by acknowledging candidly that [he or she] does not
currently have evidence to support a specified allegation. " "
The safe harbor provision has been severely criticized because it will add
"enormously to the cost of litigation... [and] accentuate[] the deterioration
of professional relations."' Some critics feel this correspondence will
become a case of "'you did it' and 'no I didn't'."' The fact that attorneys
currently threaten the use of sanctions even without the safe harbor
requirement' suggests that a safe harbor provision would not create this
destructive correspondence. The safe harbor provision only codifies current

73. 1992 Proposal at (C)(l)(A).
74. 1992 Proposal at (C)(1)(B).
75. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes ("Whether the matter should be decided
solely on the basis of written submissions or should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed,
for evidentiary presentation) will depend on the circumstances.").
76. 1992 Proposal (C)(1)(A).
77. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes. "The motion for sanction is not, however,
to be filed until at least 21 days (or such other periods as the court may set) after being served."
Id.
78. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
79. Cole, supra note 33, at 20. See also Stein, supra note 33, at 312. ("[t]hreats of sanctions
are a significant element in litigation practice . ..Ideally, frivolous papers are met with the
threat of sanctions. The frivolous paper is then withdrawn, obviating satellite litigation over
sanctions and conserving litigation resources").
80. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (1 Ith Cir. 1987) (en bane.); Fred A. Smith Lumber
Co. v. Edidin, 845 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1988); Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1988).
81. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
82. Frank, supra note 2, at 32.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 79.
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attorney conduct, while providing the salutary effect of ridding the court of
baseless positions.'
The Committee proposal requires the court to serve a "show cause"
order on the potential violator prior to a sua sponte imposition of sanctions." The show cause order will describe the conduct alleged to violate
the RuleF and provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.8" Sanctions
will not be imposed if the show cause order is issued after a voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement.' The drafters of the proposal want to
avoid affecting settlement by subsequently hitting parties with sanctions.'
While sua sponte orders to show cause account for only about 14.5 % of
the total Rule 11 activity,9' such orders are most often based on legal
frivolousness. "In even a close case, we think it extremely unlikely that a
judge, who has already decided that the law is not as a lawyer argued it, will
also decide that the loser's position was warranted by existing law."' As
discussed earlier, there is fear that Rule 11 has chilled creative advocacy.
The proposal recognizes this fear, and thus attempts to diminish the chance
that Rule 11 will have this effect in the future. 3 It introduces a new standard of "nonfrivolous[ness]" to judge creative arguments.' This creates
an "objective standard intended to eliminate any 'empty-headed pure-heart'
justification for patently frivolous arguments." 95 Frivolousness has been
defined as the absence of any basis for the proffered argument.' With a
lower standard for frivolousness, creative legal arguments should be less
susceptible to sanctions. Practically speaking, to avoid potential sanctions,
when representing a novel or creative position, the attorney should be candid

85. JOSEPH, supra note 2, at 18.
86. 1992 Proposal (C)(1)(B). See also City of El Paso v. City of Socorro, 917 F.2d 7 (5th
Cir. 1990); Maisonville v. F2 America, Inc., 902 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, IIl
S. Ct. 674 (1991).
87. Id.
88. Solovy, supra note 2, at 74. The old Rule method of imposing sua sponte sanctions had
the potential to conflict with due process requirements. Often a sua sponte decision is made
prior to the violator's notice that sanctions are under consideration, and before the violator is
provided with an opportunity to be heard. Thus some courts reversed sua sponte sanctions
conducted without notice or opportunity to be heard. G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton, 913
F.2d 824, 830-31 (10th Cir. 1990); Sanko S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.
1987). Id. at 75.
89. 1992 Proposal Advisory Committee notes.
90. Id.
91. Vairo, supra note 2, at 1-26. The 14.5% figure was computed by dividing the Sua
Sponte Rule orders (67) by the Total Rule 11 motions/sua sponte orders (1264).
92. BURBANK, supra note 2, at 21.
93. JOsEPH, supra note 2, at 22.
94. Proposal (B)(2).
95. 1992 Proposal Advisory Committee notes ("Mhe extent to which a litigant has
researched the issues and found some support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law
review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys should... be taken into
account...").
96. JOSEPH, supra note 2, at 23; see also Swindal, supra note 38, at 4.
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in recognizing the contrary authorities and be clear that he is seeking a
modification of existing law.'
The proposal maintains the current standard for an opportunity to be
heard by retaining the court's discretion to determine when an evidentiary
hearing is necessary. While the Rule states only that an evidentiary hearing's
appropriateness "will depend on the circumstances," 98 courts have recognized certain situations in which a hearing may be proper: (1) When the
(2) when the
sanction is based on the improper purpose of the paper;'
sanctioning judge does not have adequate familiarity with the case because
he did not participate in the underlying proceeding;" ° (3) when the violator
alleges inability to pay the sanction; 1 ' (4) when a large monetary sanction
t ' and, (5) when the court must resolve
is involved;
factually disputed ar103
eas.

B. Appellate Review
Until the Cooter & Gell v. HartraarxCorp. 4 decision, circuits applied
differing standards of review in considering Rule 11 decisions. That case
required federal appellate courts to apply an abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing the decisions of district courts. 5
Additionally, the current Rule does not require the district court provide
findings as to why it found the pleading, or motion frivolous. However,

97. Cole, supra note 44, at 21. See 1992 Proposal Advisory Committee notes ("[A]
contention [that is identified as an argument for change of law] should be viewed with greater
tolerance under the rule"). See also Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 1988);
Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismn'd, 485

U.S. 901 (1988).

98. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
99. Solovy, supra note 2, at 75. (citing Brown v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800
F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 206 (7th Cir.
1985); INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 405 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 927 (1987). But see In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 521 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1607 (1991); O'Neil v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO
General, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
100. Solovy, supra note 2, at 75 (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th
Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987)).
101. Solovy, supra note 2, at 75 (citing Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350,
1359 (3d Cir. 1990); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
102. Id. (citing In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 521-22).
103. Id. at 76. (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987); Media
Duplication Services, Ltd. v. HDG Software, Inc., 928 F.2d 1228, 1238 (lst Cir. 1991)).
104. 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
105. Id.
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where the reasons for the district court's decision are not obvious, many cir-

cuits require findings to provide an adequate record for appellate review."
The proposal codifies an abuse of discretion standard of review.

7

In

approving the language of Cooter & Gell, the drafters provided that if
sanctions are based on an erroneous view of the law, or a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence, the district court has abused its discretion."8
This recognizes the potential problem with an excessively deferential standard
of review.19
Unlike the current Rule, the proposal mandates findings in all proceedings resulting in sanctions, monetary or non-monetary. "The court shall
describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and
explain the basis for the sanction imposed."" 0 Some have concluded that
findings
would have the salutary effect of providing guidance to attor111
neys.

For general and specific deterrence, attorneys must know what conduct
violated the rule so that they can conform their conduct.' However, some
have criticized this requirement as conflicting with the goal of efficient court
practice."' This procedure would impose the burden on district courts of
making specific findings and conclusions in every Rule 11 case. When the
justification for the Rule 11 violation is readily discernible, there is no need
to require such an inefficient practice." 4

106. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits thoroughly analyzed a findings requirement. Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dism'd, 485 U.S. 901
(1988); Thomas v. Capital See. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988). The 2nd and 4th
Circuits have held that findings are required if sanctions are based on Rule 11. Sanko S.S. Co.
Ltd. v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1987); Straitwell v. National Steel Corp., 869 F.2d 248,
252-53 (4th Cir. 1989). However, in Miltier v. Beom, 896 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1990), the
court suggested that findings may not be required in certain circumstances.
107. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
108. Id.
109. Cf Johnson, supra note 35. "In approving the language from Cooler & Gell, the
Advisory Committee recognized that the imposition of sanctions cannot be left to the unfettered
discretion of the district court. To enforce the "least severe sanction adequate" doctrine, the
appellate court must vigorously review the district court findings." Id. at 51 n.4.
110. 1992 Proposal (B)(2)(3).
111. BURBANK, supra note 2, at 43-44.
112. Id.
113. Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Storage
Technology Partners II v. Storage Technology Corp., 117 F.R.D. 675, 678 (D. Colo. 1987);
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d at 883. But see Johnson, supra note 35, at 52.
(This author advocates that a more specific standard is necessary, one that specifies: (1) what
pleading, motion, or other paper is in violation of Rule 11; (2) why it is in violation; (3) what
factors the court considered in choosing an appropriate sanction; (4) what sanctions, if any, were
considered and rejected; (5) why the court believes that the sanction imposed is the least severe
sanction necessary to deter similar misconduct).
114. Thomas v. Capital See. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 883 (5th Cir. 1988).
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C. ContinuingDuty
The current Rule does not impose a continuing duty on an attorney; that
is, the attorney does not have to amend or withdraw a pleading if the
pleading is later found to be to baseless. For example, an attorney files a
belief pleading and later it is found to have no merit; the attorney is not
required to re-amend his pleading. The Rule applies a bright-line test which
requires that only at the time of signing the pleading need the attorney satisfy
the certification standard. Thus, in the previous example, if the attorney had
conducted reasonable inquiry before filing the belief pleading, he is immune
from sanctions regardless of whether the pleading is later known by him to
be baseless. The majority of courts agree that there is no continuing duty
after the bright-line test is satisfied.115 However, in practice, the bright line
test operates as a continuing duty since many cases require multiple pleadings. 116
Similarly, the proposal does not impose a continuing duty. However,
the proposal, adopts a somewhat different approach. Similar to current Rule
11, the proposal requires a court to evaluate a pleading when submitted to
the court. However, the proposal expands the term "submit." In addition to
the recognized meaning of "submit," the proposal defines it to include
advocating the position as well. Therefore, the new proposal would not only
continue to apply the Rule 11 standard to a subsequent filing, but it would
treat oral support for an unfounded position as sanctionable." 7
An earlier proposal"' submitted by the Advisory Committee, received
severe criticism because the proposed rule forced a party to re-plead or face
sanctions if the party later finds his position baseless. 9 This requirement
was criticized as an inefficient "retroactive exercise in perfecting pleadings."" 2 Recognizing this criticism, the proposal does not require repleading but focuses on punishing an active continuation of an untenable
position. Thus, if the party later finds his position baseless, he should not
continue to advocate that position. The Rule "does not require a formal
amendment to pleadings."' It is apparent from the changes the commenta-

115. Solovy, supra note 2, 31-32. (citing Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363,
1381 (4th Cir. 1991); MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Moore, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 29889 (9th
Cir. 1991); Beverly Gravel, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 908 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1990); Jackson
v. O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne and Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1989). See contra The
Sixth Circuit has upheld an award of sanctions against a plaintiff who failed to meet a continuing
duty to "review and reevaluate" his pleadings. Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332,
336 (6th Cir. 1988)).
116. Thomas v. Capital See. Serv., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988).
117. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
118. Vairo, supra note 2, at 1-35.
119. Frank, supra note 2; see also JOSEPH, supra note 2, at 15.
120. Frank, supra note 2, at 32.
121. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
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tors made in this area of the proposal that they intended to avoid the "perfect
pleadings" criticism. 11
D. The Responsible Parties
The current rule holds only the signer responsible for certification of the
pleadings. In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel EntertainmentGroup, the Court
held that Rule 11 could not be construed to authorize sanction against anyone
but the actual signer."
Thus, responsibility cannot be extended to the
signer's law firm.
The proposal changes this, authorizing the sanctioning of non-signers
such as "attorneys, law firms, or parties ...

[who are determined to be]

responsible for the violation." 2" The proposal provides that "the court can
make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether the sanction should
be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in addition to, or, in
unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the presentation
to the court." 1" A firm may be particularly susceptible to sanction under
the safe harbor provision. As the safe harbor provision provides at least 21
days to reconsider a filing, firms may be viewed as jointly responsible with
the signer." This provision has the salutary effect of preventing a situation
where a senior attorney would have a junior associate actually sign the
pleading to insulate himself from liability.
E. Denials, Informational & Belief Pleadings
The proposal requires that denials of factual contentions, formed after
reasonable inquiry, be "warranted on the evidence." 27 Counsel does not
have to admit an allegation when there is no contradictory evidence; rather
counsel should specifically identify any denials based on lack of information
or belief." If later the denial is found unwarranted, "the defendant should
not continue to insist on that denial. While sometimes helpful, formal
amendment of the pleadings to withdraw... [a] denial is not required...
"129

122. An earlier proposal stated the certification requirement is triggered by a party's

"presenting or maintaining a claim, defense, request ...

until it is withdrawn. ..

."

Vairo,

supra note 2, at 1-36. The final amendment provides that an attorney certifies "by presenting to
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading.
1992
Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
123. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
124. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 1992 Proposal (B)(4).
128. Similar to the burden created by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (b).
129. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

15

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 2, Art. 7

[Vol. 29

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

The proposal additionally codifies the current ability of the signer to
plead on the basis of information and belief."ro While current Rule 11 does
not sanction information and belief pleadings, the proposal's codification will
prevent any future inconsistencies. Again, if the position is later found
unwarranted, the party has the duty not to continue to advocate the
position. 131
F. DiscretionaryImposition of Sanctions
The current Rule requires the court "shall impose.., an appropriate
sanction" on the violator if it is determined that a violation has occurred. 32
Every violation, no matter how minor, must be sanctioned. As stated
earlier, the drafters wanted to avoid inconsistent rulings and 33sympathetic
determinations; they wanted also to reward a movant's efforts.
Critics argue, however, that in practice the mandatory sanctioning
provision actually makes inconsistent rulings more likely." This is a result
of differing judicial interpretation of Rule 11. Some judges currently view
Rule 11 sanctions as entirely discretionary, relying on their discretion under
the Rule to fashion the appropriate sanctions. 35 Other judges, however,
feel constrained by the "shall impose" language, thus sanctioning in
situations where, if they had discretion, they would not impose sanctions."
Thus, inconsistent application of the Rule continues, with the
outcome dependent upon a judge's view of Rule 11.1
M

The proposal provides for a discretionary standard, stating "If ... the

court determines that [there has been a violation], the court may impose an
appropriate sanction " "' While envisioning a case-by-case determination,

130. 1992 Proposal (B)(4).
131. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
133. See supra note 20.
134. Vairo, supra note 2, at 1-23; see JOSEPH, supra note 2, at 34.
135. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987) (creating class of "de minimis" or "technical" violations). See HILUARD & CHISHOI.1,
supra note 37, at 12 (Once ... a Rule 11 violation is established sanctions must be applied.
Nevertheless, up to 10% of the judges who responded . . .indicated that they would not impose
sanctions even after finding that Rule 11 had been violated.).
136. Vairo, supra note 2, at 1-23.
137. Id. at 1-22. ("[Mlember of the bar who follow such matters view some judges as 'prosanctions' and some as 'anti-[sanctions']"). See also FJC, supra note 26. (One judge dismissed
sanctions in all of 8 rulings while another judge imposed 7 sanctions in 9 rulings made); See also
accompanying note 39.
138. 1992 Proposal (C).
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the proposal nonetheless provide certain
factors that the courts should
139

consider in their sanctioning decision.
Therefore, if sanctions are discretionary, but the discretion is limited by
well defined factors, the current inconsistency will no longer persist and
rulings will become more consistent."4 Additionally, a discretionary
standard will permit flexibility. Currently, de minimis violations of Rule 11
demand sanctions. The flexibility of a discretionary standard would allow
judges to sanction only when appropriate.
Once a court determines that a sanction is appropriate, the proposal
strongly recommends that the "sanctions should not be more severe than
reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending
person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons." "
This
"least-severe sanction adequate" provision would codify the majority of
circuit's interpretation of Rule 11.142 The provision attempts to maintain
the Rule's deterrent purpose while minimizing the detrimental effects. 43
The sanction may be entirely monetary, non-monetary or a combination of
both. In principal, because the Rule's purpose is to deter rather than
compensate, monetary sanctions are paid into the court under the proposed
rule. ' " However, if requested in a motion and warranted by the inability
to effectively deter except through the use of a fee-shifting award, the court
may award attorney's fees to moving party.14 Sanctions that involve
monetary awards may not be imposed on a client when the basis for the

139. The factors include: (1)whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; (2)
whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; (3) whether it infected the entire
pleading, or only one particular count or defense; (4) whether the person has engaged in similar
conduct in other litigation; (5) whether it was intended to injure; (6) what effect it had on the
litigation process in time or expense; (7) whether the responsible person is trained in law. 1992
Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
140. See supra note 134.
141. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
142. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (loth Cir. 1990); Hilton Hotels
Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg,
Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1989); Doering v. Union County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Capital Security Serv. Inc.,
836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429,
1437 (7th Cir. 1987); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). See also William W.
Schwarzer, Sanctions under the new Federal Rule 11, A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201
(1985).
143. Schwarzer, supra note 142, at 201; WILLGING, supra note 48, at 113. ("[The goals
of fee shifting and reduction of satellite litigation may be incompatible. Shifting to a system of
specific deterrence and imposing sanctions that are sufficiently low will reduce such [satellite
litigation]").
144. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes.
145. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes. "Factors in determining the amount of the
sanction: (1) should only be for services directly and unavoidably caused by the violation and
no more; (2) should not provide compensation for the inherent cost of court activity such as
filing a complaint or answer; (3) movant should not be compensated for services that could have
been avoided by an earlier disclosure of evidence or an earlier challenge to the groundless claim
or defenses; (4) partial reimbursement of fees may be adequate for persons with "modest
financial resources". Id.
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monetary sanction is legal frivolousness." 4 Monetary responsibility for
this type of violation is appropriately placed on the attorney because the
attorney is solely responsible for researching legal sufficiency.' 47
The "least-severe sanction adequate" provision receives significant
support from judicial interpretationt" and the commentaries.' 49 However,
it has been argued that the proposal will not create the "least-severe sanction
adequate" as contemplated by the Advisory Committee." ° In order to
effectuate the "least-severe sanction adequate" provision, the Rule must
provide for more rigorous appellate review' 5' in addition to the imposition
of a specific factual findings requirement. 52 Circuits have, in the past,
articulated a "least-severe sanction adequate" policy 53 and a findings
requirement for decisions not based on obvious reasoning;' 4 nonetheless,
district courts still award excessive monetary judgments. 55 Thus, as the
circuit court relies on the discretion of the district court and the district court
sidesteps the recommendations of the circuit court, the "least severe sanction
adequate" policy is not realized. Based on this experience, the proposal,
which codifies an abuse of discretion standard, may have a similar result. 1'
IV.

OMISSION FROM THE PROPOSAL

The proposal maintains the certification standard of the current Rule for
papers warranted by existing law.' 57 Leading opinions have interpreted this
standard as requiring that the product of the attorney's inquiry itself be

146. 1992 Proposal (C)(2)(A).
147. 1992 Proposal, Advisory Committee notes. "However the court may still impose nonmonetary sanctions such as preclusion orders." Id.
148. See supra note 142.
149. BURBANK, supra note 2; Johnson, supra note 35; WILLING, supra note 48.
150. Johnson, supra note 35 at 51-52.
151. "mhe appellate courts presently review sanctions only for an abuse of discretion, and
as a result cognizable breaches of the least sanction adequate doctrine have gone uncorrected."
Id. at 51.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 142.
154. See supra note 106.
155. Lockette v. American Broadcasting Co., 118 F.R.D. 88, 91 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Pfeifer
v. Valukas, 117 F.R.D. 420, 424 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
156. Johnson, supra note 35, at 49.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. ("that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law. . .") compare Proposal (B)(1-3). Which slightly recasts this as follows: "that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances, [the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are] warranted by
existing law or... and factual contentions. ..."
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objectively reasonable. 158 This product approach focuses on the competency
of the attorney as evidenced her pleading rather than the reasonableness of
the attorney's inquiry in preparation of the pleading. This focus can have the

unfortunate result of punishing the attorney for "inadequate scholarship."' 59

For example; an attorney conducts an objectively reasonable amount of prefiling inquiry and drafts a complaint which she honestly believes is "warranted by existing law." If the court, following the product rule, finds the
pleading is objectively unreasonable, then the attorney is sanctionable under
Rule 11. Critics argue that this type of Rule 11 application over-deters
meritless papers, chilling an attorney's creativity."w An attorney will shy
away from creative representation for fear the court may find her submissions unreasonable.
The purpose of Rule 11 does not include the enforcement of lawyer
competency. A more effective means of deterring lawyer incompetence is
through informal peer monitoring. The client, not the court, is the primary
victim of lawyer ineptness and Rule 11 offers nothing to the client other than
the possibility of being sanctioned. It is ironic that under the proposed rule,
the victim of improper representation may get punished "for having been victimized."16

It is the opinion of this writer that the proposal must provide guidance
to the circuits for interpreting the certification standard. An approach that
focuses on lawyer pre-filing inquiry would more appropriately achieve the
Rule's goal of deterring baseless filings while minimizing destructive sideeffects.
CONCLUSION

Since the 1983 amendment, courts have applied Rule 11 vigorously and
inconsistently. While the Rule has improved pre-filing inquiry, it has also
generated concern that it is chilling meritorious claims, increasing satellite
litigation, contributing to the bar's incivility problem, and weakening the
attorney-client relationship. In response, the Advisory Committee for Judicial
Rules drafted a revision to the 1983 amendment. Their proposal would
significantly change Rule 11 activity, primarily by reducing inconsistent
application of the Rule and reducing the imposition of large monetary
sanctions. In general, the proposal is sound and should meet its goal to
"broaden the scope of this obligation,... [while] reduc[ing] the number of

motions for sanctions presented to the court."
158. Eastway Construction v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Zaidivar
v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230
(9th Cir. 1986).
159. Alex Elson & Edwin A Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D.
361, 364 (1988).
160. Id. at 365; see also BURBANK, supra note 2, at 21.
161. Elson & Rothschild, supra note 159, at 368.
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APPENDIX

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 PROPOSAL

Italics indicate portion of previous formulation that are deleted from the
proposal; underlined portions are the additions by the proposal. The
unaffected language is regular type.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party
representedby an attorney shall be signed by a least one attorney of record
in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an
attorney, shall be signed by the party. whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not representedby an attorney shall sign the party'spleading,
motion, or otherpaper and state the party's address. Each paper shall state
the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity thatthe averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustainedby corroboratingcircumstancesis abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion, or otherpaper,that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and beliefformed after reasonableinquiry it is well
grounded infact and is warrantedby existing law or a goodfaith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposedfor any improperpurpose, such as to harassor to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other An unsigned paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless
it is signedpromptly after the omission of the signature is corrected promptly
after being called to the attention of thepleaderor movant attorney or party.
(b)Representation to Court. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 'or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty,
or both, an appropriatesanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of thefiling of the pleading, motion, or otherpaper,including a reasonable attorney'sfee. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing. submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other
paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation:
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law:
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(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery: and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of
information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may,
subject to the condition stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon
the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held iointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b)
and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not
violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction, Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation
of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the
limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into
court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorney's fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a
voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against
the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the
conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis
for the sanction imposed.
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(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
James R. Simpson*
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